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The Concept of Nationhood and the Implementation of Hadith on Nationalism in the Salafi Perspective: A Critical Study of Contemporary Islamic Law

Abstract: This study critically examines the concept of nationhood and nationalism as understood by the Salafi group and analyzes the implementation of hadiths related to nationalism within the framework of contemporary Islamic law. Using a qualitative field research approach, the study focuses on approximately 200 Salafi adherents spread across Java and Sumatra. Informants were selected through purposive sampling, and data collection methods included interviews, surveys, and documentation. The research uncovers diverse interpretations of nationhood and nationalism within the Salafi community. A minority of Salafi adherents view nationalism as lacking a strong foundation in Islamic law, considering it a secular concept incompatible with Shari'ah. However, the majority, influenced by contextualist approaches in contemporary Islamic jurisprudence, argue that nationalism aligns with Islamic principles, particularly when understood as a form of *maslahah* and *ukhuwwah wathaniyyah*. This perspective is supported by contemporary Islamic scholars who emphasize protecting societal harmony and national unity as part of *maqasid al-shari'ah*. In practice, Salafi adherents demonstrate their acceptance of nationalism through various socio-religious activities. For instance, Salafi educational institutions integrate the study of Indonesia's independence history into their curriculum, emphasizing the moral responsibility of contributing to national welfare. This study makes academic contributions by providing a deep understanding of how contemporary Salafi groups connect Islamic teachings with modern concepts of nationhood, enriching the discourse on the adaptability of Islamic law in addressing contemporary socio-political challenges, and offering a practical framework for integrating religious values with national identity. It also contributes to discussions on pluralism and nation-building within an Islamic context.

Keywords: Contemporary Islamic Law, Hadith, Nationalism, Patriotism, Salafi.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of nationality and nationalism in the Islamic world has long been a controversial topic, with different schools and understandings of how these principles relate to the teachings of Islam.¹ In Indonesia, where the majority of the population is Muslim, nationalism has become an integral part of the life of the nation and State.² However, for the Salafis, known for their conservative understanding of the teachings of Islam, the concept of nationalism is often viewed with skepticism.³ As a sect that tends to maintain a conservative understanding of the teachings of Islam, Salafis are often identified with views that tend to reject modern ideas, including the concept of nation-state and nationalism.⁴ However, with the growing socio-political context in the Muslim world,⁵ especially in Indonesia, there are variations of views among Salafists regarding the relevance and acceptance of nationalism.⁶

In contemporary Islamic law, there is an emphasis on the principles of *maslahah*⁷ and *maqasid al-shari'ah*, which prioritizes the interests of the ummah and broader sharia goals, such as maintaining unity, social harmony, and the welfare of the ummah. Contemporary Islamic law, with its contextual and adaptive approach to the challenges of the times, allows for a more flexible understanding of nationalism and nationalism. However, few studies have examined how Salafi groups understand nationalism within the framework of contemporary Islamic law and how they implement these teachings in social and political life in Indonesia.

¹ M. Bhim, "Islamic nationalism, populism, and democratization in the Maldives," dalam *The Routledge Handbook of Populism in the Asia Pacific*, 2023, 240–54, <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003160014-21>.

² H. Susanto dan L. Amalia, "Islamic epistemology as science and philosophy in the basis of Indonesian nationalism," vol. 2081, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1063/1.5094028>.

³ D.I. Ansusa Putra, Sayuti, dan R.A.A. Rahim, "Inconsistency of Salafi's Bid'ah Concept: Shifting the Qur'an and Hadith Law Consideration During Covid-19 Pandemic in Indonesia," *Al-Risalah: Forum Kajian Hukum dan Sosial Kemasyarakatan* 24, no. 1 (2024): 116–34, <https://doi.org/10.30631/alrisalah.v24i1.1523>.

⁴ A. Belhaj, "Secularism as an Anti-Religious Conspiracy: Salafi Challenges to French laïcité," *Religions* 15, no. 5 (2024), <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel15050546>.

⁵ A. Subakir, "Challenging the Mainstreams: Broadcasting Salafi Da'wah on Indonesian TV Channels," *Ulumuna* 28, no. 2 (2024): 681–709, <https://doi.org/10.20414/ujis.v28i2.1115>.

⁶ O.S. Dewi, A.K. Fata, dan M. Fauzi, "The Middle-Class Muslims' Responses Toward the Salafi Da'wah: A Study on Hijrah celebrities," *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik* 27, no. 3 (2024): 277–290, <https://doi.org/10.22146/jsp.72138>.

⁷ Muhammad Fahrudin Nur dkk., "Prohibition of Friday Prayer During COVID-19 Pandemic Period Againsts Red Zone Areas in Islamic Law Perspective," *MILRev: Metro Islamic Law Review* 1, no. 1 (26 Desember 2022): 54–69, <https://doi.org/10.32332/milrev.v1i1.6190>.

Previous research has largely discussed the relationship between Islam and nationalism in general⁸ and tends to ignore the specific perspectives of the Salafi group and the application of Islamic legal principles in the context of nationality.⁹ These studies focus more on the general view of rejection or acceptance of secular concepts without connecting them deeply with more contemporary principles of Islamic law, such as adaptation to pluralism and the modern state system.¹⁰ This gap opens up opportunities for further research examining how contemporary Islamic law, particularly from the perspective of *maqasid al-shari'ah*, can provide space for Salafists to understand and accept nationalism. This study aims to fill this gap by examining how Salafi groups understand and implement the concepts of nationalism and the relevance of hadiths related to nationalism in a more adaptive framework of contemporary Islamic law.

The novelty of this study lies in the approach taken to analyze the relationship between contemporary Islamic law, nationalism, and Salafi perspectives. This study offers a new perspective by combining the study of contemporary Islamic law, nationalism, and nationality in one comprehensive study, which has not been widely discussed in previous studies. The gap in the research in this study is the lack of an in-depth analysis of Salafi groups' acceptance or rejection of nationalism within the framework of contextual contemporary Islamic law. Most of the literature only touches on this issue from a theoretical point of view without looking at the practice of implementation in everyday life.

Starting from the description above, the researcher will explore and study the concept of nationality and the implementation of nationalism from a Salafi perspective, focusing on analyzing contemporary Islamic law. This study aims to respond to the dispute that occurs among Salafists regarding whether nationalism and nationality are contrary to Islamic principles or in line with Islamic values taught by the Prophet Muhammad SAW. From the perspective of contemporary Islamic law, the author will explore how the principles of *maslahah* (the benefit of the ummah) and *maqasid al-shari'ah* (sharia purpose) are used to assess whether the concept of nationalism is acceptable within the framework of Islamic law. Contemporary Islamic law, which prioritizes flexibility and contextualization in responding to the challenges of the times, can

⁸ Al Chaidar dan Herdi Sahrasad, "Negara, Islam, dan Nasionalisme Sebuah Perspektif," *Jurnal Kawistara* 3, no. 1 (21 April 2013), <https://doi.org/10.22146/kawistara.3960>.

⁹ Zikriadi Zikriadi, Muhammad Amri, dan Indo Santalia, "Pemahaman Keagamaan Salafi Dan Kegaduhan Di Tengah Masyarakat Serta Solusi Penyelesaiannya," *Mushaf Journal: Jurnal Ilmu Al Quran Dan Hadis* 2, no. 3 (11 November 2022): 288-298.

¹⁰ Abdul Majid dkk., "Salafi, Hadith, and Islamic Law: Identity Politics and Wahabi Movement in East Kalimantan," *AHKAM: Jurnal Ilmu Syariah* 23, no. 1 (22 Juni 2023), <https://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/ahkam/article/view/32139>.

provide a moderate answer to the relationship between religion and the modern nation-state. Thus, the author will examine how Salafi, through an adaptive approach to contemporary Islamic law, responds to nationalism to maintain the unity of the ummah and common interests in the context of the modern State.

METHOD

This study is field research. This research uses a qualitative approach to solving the problems discussed. This approach was chosen because this research only describes the problem of the Concept of Nationality and the implementation of the Hadith of Nationalism from a Salafi perspective. The research method used in this study is qualitative descriptive. This method was chosen because it is more appropriate to describe and analyze the value of national nationalism derived from the Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad and then understood and implemented by Salafis. The subjects of this study are the followers of Salafi teachings of approximately 200 people spread across the islands of Java and Sumatra. In selecting informants, the researcher uses the *purposive sampling* technique. The goal is for the data obtained to be aimed at and developed continuously from one sample to the next. The criteria for selecting informants include Muslims with Salafi understanding, puberty, and Rushdun, Having a broad Islamic religious perspective or having studied at Islamic boarding schools, and Having attended public school with at least high school graduates/equivalent. In this study, the researcher used several techniques to collect research data: interviews, surveys, and documentation. This study uses the source triangulation technique to check the validity of the data. Triangulation with sources means comparing and rechecking the degree of trust of information obtained from different sources.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Hadith of the Prophet Muhammad on Nationalism and National Insight

Loving the homeland is a natural thing in humans. Because of its natural nature inherent in humans, Islam does not prohibit it as long as it does not contradict Islamic teachings/values. Although love for the homeland is natural, it does not mean that Islam

does not regulate it.¹¹ Islam, a religion perfect for human life, regulates human nature in loving their homeland to become human beings who can play a maximum role in building the life of the nation and State and balance life in this world and the hereafter.

In Islam, the Prophet Muhammad PBUH taught to always love the homeland, this can be seen in the hadith below;

اللَّهُمَّ حَبِّبْ إِلَيْنَا الْمَدِينَةَ كَحُبِّنَا مَكَّةَ أَوْ أَشَدَّ (رواه البخارى)

Meaning: "O Allah, make us love Medina, as our love for Makkah, or beyond Makkah". (HR. Al-Bukhari)

عَنْ أَنَسٍ أَنَّ النَّبِيَّ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ كَانَ إِذَا قَدِمَ مِنْ سَفَرٍ فَتَنَظَّرَ إِلَى جُدُرَاتِ الْمَدِينَةِ أَوْضَعَ نَاقَتَهُ وَإِنْ كَانَ عَلَى دَابَّةٍ حَرَّكَهَا مِنْ حُبِّهَا وَفِي الْحَدِيثِ دَلَالَةٌ عَلَى فَضْلِ الْمَدِينَةِ وَعَلَى مَشْرُوعِيَّةِ حُبِّ الْوَطَنِ وَالْحَنِينِ إِلَيْهِ

Meaning: Narrated from Anas's companion; that the Prophet PBUH when he returned from traveling, and saw the walls of his medina speeding up the speed of his camel. If he rides a camel, he moves it (to speed up) because of his love for Medina. (HR. Bukhari, Ibnu Hibban, dan Tirmidzi)

وكان صلى الله عليه وسلم، يحب عائشة، يحب اباها، يحب اسامة، يحب سبطي ويحب الحلوة والعسل، ويحب جبل احد، ويحب وطنه، ويحب الأنصار

Meaning: "The Prophet is a figure who loves Aisha, loves Aisha's father, loves Usamah, loves both ends, loves sweets and honey, loves Mount Uhud, loves his homeland and loves the companions of Anshor. (HR. Imam Ad-Dzahabi)

The above hadiths show the Prophet's love for his homeland, Makkah, and Medina, the city he visited during the struggle to spread the wings of Islam. The statement of the Prophet in the hadith above can be understood that he is a person who has a very high nationalism and loves his homeland very much. The philosophy and spirit of the hadith above can certainly be applied to the Indonesian context. In the context of Indonesia, of course, it is not much different. Every Indonesian citizen must have a love for this Indonesian homeland. The form of practicing hadith is to love the homeland, so for the Indonesian people, it is to love their homeland, namely the country of Indonesia.

In addition to nationalism, there are many hadiths of the Prophet that teach his people to have a broad and open national insight. This can be seen in the hadith below;

¹¹ Agus Mukmin, "Konsep Nasionalisme M. Quraish Shihab Dalam Tafsir Al-Mishbah," *Iqtishaduna* 4, no. 1 (2021): 541-569, <https://doi.org/10.53888/iqtishaduna.v6i1.427>.

حَدَّثَنِي مَنْ سَمِعَ خُطْبَةَ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ فِي وَسْطِ أَيَّامِ التَّشْرِيقِ فَقَالَ : (يَا أَيُّهَا النَّاسُ أَلَا إِنَّ رَبَّكُمْ وَاحِدٌ وَإِنَّ أَبَاكُمْ وَاحِدٌ ، أَلَا لَا فَضْلَ لِعَرَبِيٍّ عَلَى أَعْجَمِيٍّ وَلَا لِعَجَمِيٍّ عَلَى عَرَبِيٍّ وَلَا لِأَحْمَرَ عَلَى أَسْوَدَ وَلَا أَسْوَدَ عَلَى أَحْمَرَ إِلَّا بِالتَّقْوَى ، أَبْلَغْتُ ؟) قَالُوا : بَلَّغَ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وَسَلَّمَ

"He told me a companion who heard the sermon of the Prophet in the middle of the day of Tashriq. He said: 'O man, remember! Indeed, your Lord is one, and your father is one. Remember! Nothing for Arabs is more important than non-Arabs. Nor are red-skinned people more important than blacks. On the other hand, no black person is more important than a person with red skin, except for his devotion. Have you received this message?' The companions replied: '[We testify that] the Messenger of Allah has conveyed this message.' [HR. Imam Ahmad]

الناس بنو آدم وآدم من تراب

"Man is a descendant of the Prophet Adam, and Adam was created from dust." [HR. Imam Ahmad]

كل مولود يولد على الفطرة

"All babies born are born under the condition of fitrah." (HR. Bukhari & Muslim).

Based on the hadith above, the Prophet Muhammad taught his people that human beings are essentially the same because they come from the same source, namely from the Prophet Adam. The Prophet taught that there is no difference in the position of human beings from one another except because of the value of piety, which mirrors their behavior.

Profile of the Salafi group

In various literatures that discuss Salafi and the delivery of lectures by Salafi ustadz themselves, it is stated that Salafi is not a school or organization but a *manhaj* or method, namely, how to be religious (Islamic) as practiced by previous people or generations (*salaf*). The meaning of *salaf* here is the three best generations of Islam: *Sahabah*, *Tabi'in*, and *Tabi'it Tabi'in*. During these three best generations, Islam was still seen as pure and uncontaminated by foreign influences, giving birth to new things (*bid'ah*) in religion. The spirit of returning to the Qur'an and the Sunnah is also stated to be understood by the *salaf* generation, and not one that prioritizes the ratio like the *Mu'tazilah* group and not one that is based on the sense of the *Sufis*. Recent developments after the era of the three best generations of Islam are said to be the source of distorting the teachings of Islam. The birth of *mutakallimin*, which Muslim

philosophers and Sufis continued, was the culprit of the chaos that occurred in the teachings of Islam.¹²

Amid these distortions in Islamic teachings, there is a group that strives to consistently maintain the legacy of that generation of Islam, which is then known as Salafi. They try to practice the teachings of Islam in a pure and consequential manner, as in the past generations of salaf, and reject innovations (*bid'ah*) in religion.¹³ Historically, several terms are often associated and identified with Salafi, namely: *ahlul hadith*; *ahlu atsar*; *ahlus Sunnah* or *ahlus sunnah wal jam'ah*; *firqah najiyah*; *thâifah manshûrah*; and *Wahhabis*, each of which will be explained in more detail in the following sections: first, the Salafists. The term salaf, etymologically in Arabic, means everyone who has preceded you, namely your ancestors and previous people who are still related to you; They have a life and virtue that surpasses you.

Terminologically, salaf means the previous (earliest) generation of Islam, namely the companions, the followers of the companions (*tâbi'in*), and the followers who follow the companions (*tâbi'ut tâbi'in*), which the Prophet called the best generation as he said: "The best man is in my period (*Sahabah*), then after (*tâbi'in*), and then after (*tâbi'ut tâbi'in*). In other literature, it is stated that the meaning of salaf is only devoted to companions, while others are included as salaf because they follow companions. Meanwhile, in terms of the era, the term salaf is used to show the best and most likely generation to follow and emulate. A person who performs Salafi *manhaj* is said to be a person who maintains the safety of faith and *manhaj* following what is the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings of Allaah be upon him) and his companions before disputes and divisions occur.

Division of Salafi Groups

Din Wahid classified the Salafi movement in Indonesia into three categories: "*purist*," "*haraki*" (movement), and "*jihadi*." The three have the same views on the three

¹² Muhammad Zainal Abidin, "Dinamika Gerakan Salafi Dan Paradoks Kosmopolitanisme Islam: Problema Terminologis, Sejarah Dan Ajaran," *Tashwir* 10, no. 1 (30 Oktober 2022): 17-35, <https://doi.org/10.18592/jt.v10i1.7280>.

¹³ Muhammadiyah Muhammadiyah, "Manhaj Salafiyah," *Jurnal Ilmu Agama: Mengkaji Doktrin, Pemikiran, Dan Fenomena Agama* 14, no. 2 (2013): 147-161.

basic teachings of Salafism, namely monotheism, following Sunnah and rejecting heresy, and *al-wala wa al-bara*. All Salafi groups agree on the three dimensions of monotheism (*rububiyyah*, *uluhiyyah*, and *al-asma wa al-sifat*). As for the differences, the "purist" Salafi group emphasizes unconditional loyalty to the government, while the "haraki" and "jihadi" Salafi groups reject absolute loyalty to the ruler.¹⁴

Muhammad Ikhsan, citing the opinion of Abu 'Abdirrahman al-Talibi, divided Salafi into two categories, namely Salafi Yamani and Salafi Haraki. There are several important and distinctive ideas of the Salafi movement, namely: first, *hajr mubtadi'* (isolation of heretics), they (Salafi Yamani) are trying hard to criticize and clean up the various heresies that have been believed and practiced by various layers of Islamic society. This group will issue *tahdzir* (warning) to people who do things considered heretical. Unlike the Salafi Haraki, they tend to see the mechanism of *hajr al-mubtadi'* as something that is not done because everything depends on the benefits and mafsadat. Second, they reject involvement in politics (parliament and elections), and they (Salafi Yamani) view involvement in all practical political processes, such as general elections (elections), as a heresy and deviation. They consider the election to be an attempt to unite Allah (*shirk*) because it sets rules based on the majority vote (the people), even though Allah is the only one who has the right to it. This attitude is in contrast to Salafi Haraki, who tends to consider the issue of elections as nothing more than an administrative part that allows us to adopt it from anywhere as long as it brings benefits. Third, Salafi Yamani and Haraki's attitudes toward other Islamic movements are greatly influenced by their views on applying *hajr al-mubtadi'*.¹⁵ Salafi Yamani is known to be very extreme and often without compromise at all.

Meanwhile, Salafi *Haraki* tends to be 'moderate' in responding to other movements.¹⁶ Fourth, in general, Salafis believe that it is not permissible to *khuruj* or carry

¹⁴ Abdul Jamil Wahab, "Membaca Fenomena Baru Gerakan Salafi di Solo," *Dialog* 42, no. 2 (2019): 225-240, <https://doi.org/10.47655/dialog.v42i2.335>.

¹⁵ Faizin Faizin dan Afridawati Afridawati, "The Salafi Da'wah Movement and Its Implications on Religious Rituals in Kota Sungai Penuh," *Ishlah: Jurnal Ilmu Ushuluddin, Adab Dan Dakwah* 5, no. 1 (30 Juni 2023): 133-144, <https://doi.org/10.32939/ishlah.v5i1.246>.

¹⁶ Wahyu Abdul Jafar, "Persepsi Masyarakat Kota Bengkulu Terhadap Paham Islam Moderat," *Samarah* 3, no. 1 (2019): 177-204, <https://doi.org/10.22373/sjkh.v3i1.3213>.

out separatist movements in a legitimate Islamic government. As a consequence of this principle, there is an impression that the Yamani Salafis tend to be 'reluctant' to criticize the government. Nevertheless, *manhaj* al-Salafi provides an opportunity for that, although it is limited to "four eyes" to the ruler. Meanwhile, Salafi Haraki considers it a must to be against the government if it sees that the government does wrongdoing.

Meanwhile, Noorhaidi Hasan divided the supporters of the Salafi movement into *Yamani* and *Haraki* or *Sururi*. The *Yamani* group is the followers of Sheikh Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'i, the founder of Darul Hadith, an institution that studies Salafism in Yemen's Dammaj. Meanwhile, the Salafi *Haraki* group is the followers of Sheikh Muhammad Surur bin Nayef Zainal Abidin. He is at odds with Saudi clerics, especially those who legitimize the decision of the Saudi rulers to invite American soldiers to defend their country from the threat of Saddam Hussein. Quintan Wiktorowicz divides the Salafi movement into three, namely *Purist* (pure preaching), *Politics* (they intersect with politics), and *Jihadist* (spreading Islamic teachings with violence). Abu Mujahid divides Salafi into three categories, namely, Salafi *Jihadi*, Salafi *Haraki*, and Salafi *Yamani*.¹⁷

Salafi Views on Nationalism and Nationalism

Religious issues are currently interesting to discuss, especially the issues of nationality and nationalism. Although the concepts of nationalism and nationality are clear in theory, the facts in the field are still often debated, especially in Salafi groups when associated with Islamic teachings. The results of the interviews prove this,

*"The concept of religious nationalism is good, but it cannot be done haphazardly. Not all state policies that smell of nationalism can be immediately accepted but must be sorted out first based on sharia."*¹⁸

*"Honoring the treasurer is a prohibited act of heresy. Respecting the flag is the same as respecting idols done by previous humankind in the Jahiliyah era."*¹⁹

However, most Salafi groups understand the concept of nationalism more softly and follow the opinions of most scholars.

¹⁷ Abdul Jamil Wahab, "Membaca Fenomena Baru Gerakan Salafi di Solo," *Dialog* 42, no. 2 (2019): 225-240, <https://doi.org/10.47655/dialog.v42i2.335>.


¹⁸ Ashari Midana, Personal Interview, 2024.

¹⁹ Nayuslian Saputra, Personal interview, 2024.

*"The respect and raising of the red and white flag by Muslims may be done because it is only a form of respect for the martyrs who have sacrificed their lives and bodies for the independence of Indonesia."*²⁰

This interview data is also strengthened by survey data, which shows that as many as 5% of research informants stated that Salafi adherents interpret nationalism as a form of heresy. So, it is natural for them to think that the concept of nationalism is not in line with Islamic law. However, most Salafists interpret the concept of nationalism positively, with details of 50% of informants interpreting nationalism as an attitude of patriotism. As many as 30% of informants stated that nationalism is a love for the homeland. As many as 15% of informants stated that nationalism is a positive action in order to fill the independence of the Republic of Indonesia with positive things. This data is seen in the diagram below.

Diagram 1. Understanding the Concept of Nationalism



Source: Survey on the Concept of Nationalism & Religious Nationality in 2024

This difference of opinion among Salafis stems from the debate about whether the Prophet Muhammad taught nationalism or not. The majority of Salafists argue that the Prophet Muhammad taught his companions to have an attitude of nationalism, while a minority of Salafis argue that nationalism is not a teaching of the Prophet Muhammad. This is as per the interview data,

*"The substance of the concept of nationalism is the same as the value of hubul wathon taught by the Prophet; in fact, he also gave a direct example to his companions by encouraging them to love the cities of Mecca and Medina."*²¹

²⁰ Awi Jaya Wardana, Personal Interview, 2024.

²¹ Fajar Alam Masri, Personal interview, 2024.

"The foundation of nationalism is love for the homeland; this concept is very much in line with the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, who loved his homeland very much, namely the cities of Mecca and Medina."²²

In addition to data that supports that nationalism is included in the teachings of the Prophet, there is also data from informants who state that nationalism is not part of Islamic teachings.

"Nationalism has no proposition. Something that has no evidence of *shorih* should not be forced to become part of the *Shari'ah*, making up something that is not *Shari'ah*, including prohibited acts of heresy."²³

This field fact is supported by the results of a survey that shows that 87% of informants stated that nationalism is included in the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad, while as many as 12% of informants stated that nationalism is not from the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad. Meanwhile, 1% of informants do not know whether nationalism is included in the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad.²⁴

The essence of this debate actually comes from the difference in understanding of the nationalism hadith narrated by Imam Ahmad bin Hambal,

وَاللّٰهُ اِنَّكَ لَحَنِيزٌ اَرْضِ اللّٰهِ وَاَحَبُّ اَرْضِ اللّٰهِ اِلَى اللّٰهِ وَلَوْلَا اَنِّيْ اُخْرِجْتُ مِنْكَ مَا خَرَجْتُ

"For Allah's sake, it is indeed the best of Allah's land and the most beloved by Him. If it weren't for me being kicked out of it, I wouldn't have left it." (HR. Ahmad)

Based on the facts on the ground, the majority of Salafi adherents agree that this hadith narrated by Imam Ahmad is the basis for nationalism. They argue that the Prophet's love for the city of Mecca, which is his birthplace, is a postulate of *shorih* that can be used as the basis for the Sunnah of nationalism. The love of the city of Mecca can be pirated to other cities, so loving the homeland, even though it is not the city of Mecca, is a form of practicing this hadith. This is the results of the interview,

"The city of Mecca in the hadith narrated by Imam Ahmad is a symbol or symbol that can be *qiyas* to other cities. Mecca is repressive of the birthplace, so other cities where humankind was born can also be attributed to the city of Mecca."²⁵

"The hadith of nationalism is universal. The substance of this hadith does not lie in the city but in loving the city of birth, so that in any city a person is born, he is obliged to love him. Loving one's

²² Arjun, Personal interview, 2024.

²³ Betario Dwi Feresa, Personal Interview, 2024.

²⁴ Survey on the Concept of Nationalism & Religious Nationality in 2024

²⁵ Muhammad Aziz Mulkansyah, Personal interview, 2024.

homeland is a form of nationalism, so nationalism is indirectly a teaching of the Prophet Muhammad."²⁶

As for the basis of the Salafi group that rejects nationalism as a teaching of the Prophet Muhammad, he argues that this nationalism hadith is not appropriate if it is used as a postulate for the Sunnah of nationalism because it does not *shorih* mention the Sunnah of nationalism. The Prophet Muhammad in this hadith only reveals that if the inhabitants of Mecca do not expel him, the Prophet will remain in Mecca. This is in line with the results of the interview,

"The hadith of nationalism is not appropriate as a postulate for the blasphemy of nationalism. The Prophet Muhammad in this hadith does not tell us to love a person's birthplace, but the Prophet only reveals that if the people of Mecca do not expel him, he will still live in the city of Mecca."²⁷

The data related to the blasphemy of the nationalism hadith is strengthened by the survey results, which showed that as many as 59% of the informants stated that they agreed if the nationalism hadith narrated by Imam Ahmad became an argument or postulate of nationalism. As many as 33% of informants strongly agree that this hadith is an argument or postulate of nationalism. Meanwhile, as many as 6% of informants stated that they did not agree if this hadith was used as a postulate of nationalism, and as many as 2% of informants stated that they strongly disagreed with the hadith of the Prophet being used as a postulate of nationalism.²⁸

The problem in this nationalism hadith, if studied more deeply, is because of the difference in understanding whether *hubbul wathon minal iman* (love of the homeland is part of faith). Based on the facts, most Salafi adherents stated that *hubbul wathon minal iman* (love of the homeland is part of faith), while the Salafi group that rejects *hubbul wathon minal iman* is a minority group. This is based on the results of the interview,

"Love for the homeland, and faith are two things that have a common point, namely the same love; Love for the homeland means loving God's creation, while faith means loving the *kholik/creator*. A person will not perfectly love the creator without loving his creation. Therefore, it makes sense that love for the homeland is part of faith."²⁹

²⁶ Ahmad Fahrizal, Personal interview, 2024.

²⁷ Muammar Mahabuddin, Personal interview, 2024.


²⁸ Survey on the Concept of Nationalism & Religious Nationality in 2024

²⁹ Faridatul Mukarimah, Persoalan interview, 2024.

Meanwhile, the Salafi minority group that rejects the concept of *hubbul wathon minal iman* (love of the homeland is part of faith) is based on the fact that nationalism is a matter of *insyanyiah*, or instinct alone, not a matter of faith or faith. This is the results of the interview,

*"The problem of nationalism is a matter of humanity or instinct, not a matter of faith, just like an animal, if it is disturbed by its territory, the animal will fight against other animals that invade its territory. Humans are the same; if anyone is in charge of their area of power, they will resist even though the area is not their homeland."*³⁰

Diagram 2. Hubbul Wathon Minal Iman



Source: Survey on the Concept of Nationalism & Religious Nationality in 2024

The next interesting problem is when nationalism is associated with the obligation to establish an Islamic state. The majority of the Salafi group stated that establishing an Islamic state is not an obligation that must be carried out immediately. When the Indonesian government applies Islamic values to its policies, Muslims must comply with the policy. This is the results of the interview,

*"In my opinion, there is no obligation or necessity to establish an Islamic State even though the country does not directly mention its regulations based on Islam, but the values that are carried out following the principles in Islam are permissible, and we are obliged to obey and obey the government."*³¹

Meanwhile, the Salaf minority group requires the establishment of an Islamic state, reasoning that only the Islamic government can guarantee the policies that will be

³⁰ Moh La Andi Rais Imran Yatim, Personal interview, 2024.

³¹ Wardana, Personal Interview.

made later following Islamic law. The next reason is a postulate that states that *la hukma ila billah*, so Muslims must establish an Islamic state. This data is following the results of the interviews,

*"Without the realization of Islamic government, there is no guarantee that legal products or government policies will follow Islamic law. Therefore, Muslims should have an Islamic government."*³²

This data is also strengthened by the results of a survey that shows that the majority of Salafi informants, as many as 95%, stated that they are not obliged to establish an Islamic state. As for the details, 55% of informants stated that it was not mandatory to establish an Islamic state, and as many as 40% of informants stated that it was not mandatory. Meanwhile, those who support establishing an Islamic state are no more than 5%. In detail, 4% of informants stated that it was mandatory to establish an Islamic state, and 1% of informants stated that it was mandatory to do so.³³

The Form of Implementation of Salafi Understanding of Nationalism

Implementing nationalism can certainly be done through various positive activities. However, before that, it is very important to know what the Salafi adherents think about understanding its implementation and whether it can be realized in various forms of positive deeds or not. Based on the facts in the field, it is known that most informants adherent to Salafi believe that implementing nationalism and nationalism can certainly be carried out in various positive activities and activities. Love for the homeland can be manifested in various forms of activities that can provide many benefits to others. This is the results of the interview,

*"Nationalism should not be interpreted narrowly as only defending the homeland when someone wants to colonize. Love for the homeland can be done in various forms. A farmer's form of love for his homeland is planting rice or other crops. A teacher forms his love for his homeland by teaching. A doctor forms his love for his homeland by treating the sick. Everyone can prove their love for their homeland by doing activities according to their respective professions."*³⁴

Salafi groups that state that the implementation of national hadith and nationalism cannot be carried out in various positive activities and activities are minority

³² Abdullah, Personal Interview, 2024.

³³ Survey on the Concept of Nationalism & Religious Nationality in 2024

³⁴ Muhammad Rival, Personal interview, 2024.

groups that do not agree with the concept of nationalism. From the beginning, they assumed nationalism was not a product of Islam. This is the results of the interview,

*"Nationalism is a Western product that does not follow Islamic teachings; therefore, it does not need to be implemented in various activities."*³⁵

This data is strengthened by a survey stating that most informants, amounting to 97%, agree and strongly agree that implementing national hadith and nationalism can be carried out in various positive activities. Meanwhile, 3% of informants disagreed with implementing national hadith and said that nationalism could not be carried out in various positive activities.³⁶

Based on the results of this survey, it can be concluded that most Salafi groups state that implementing national hadith and nationalism can be carried out in various positive activities. One way to foster a nationalist spirit in the younger generation is to remember the history of the struggle for the independence of the Indonesian State.³⁷ An effective way to commemorate the history of independence is by conducting a national ceremony to commemorate the historic day of the Indonesian nation.³⁸ This is reinforced by the facts on the ground that show that Salafi believers agree that national ceremonies commemorating historic days need to be carried out to increase the sense of nationalism and nationality that has begun to fade among teenagers.

*"Muslims need to carry out a national ceremony to commemorate the historic day of independence because the ceremony is part of filling independence and remembering the merits of the heroes who fought in order to uphold justice and so that we can worship peacefully without any interference from the enemies of Islam."*³⁹

*"The national ceremony commemorating the historic day is a manifestation of our gratitude to the nation's heroes who have sacrificed their souls and bodies so that we can all be free, able to worship Allah in peace. The Prophet once said: Whoever is not grateful to man, he is not grateful to God."*⁴⁰

³⁵ Bambang Setiawan, Personal Interview, 2024.

³⁶ Survey on the Concept of Nationalism & Religious Nationality in 2024

³⁷ "Flag Ceremony as a Form of Nationalism," accessed July 12, 2024, <https://kalteng.kemenag.go.id/kanwil/berita/311701/Upacara-Bendera-Sebagai-Wujud-Nasionalisme>.

³⁸ Wafiq Laelatul Kodrianingsih dkk., "Growing the Spirit of Nationalism in Students Through the Flag Ceremony for Heroes' Day," *Jurnal Pengabdian Magister Pendidikan IPA* 6, no. 1 (21 Februari 2023): 94-101, <https://doi.org/10.29303/jpmipi.v6i1.2692>.

³⁹ Haikal Muhklis, Personal interview, 2024.

⁴⁰ Muhammad Azzam, Personal interview, 2024.

As for those who refused the ceremony to commemorate the historic day, only minority groups from the Salafi community. They assume there is no evidence to perform a flag ceremony; something without evidence does not need to be done. This is based on the results of the interview,

*"The implementation of the flag ceremony has no evidence, so it does not need to be carried out. However, if anyone wants to do it, please, we still respect."*⁴¹

This data is also strengthened by a survey that shows that as many as 88% of informants agree that Muslims hold national ceremonies to commemorate historic days. According to Rincinaya, 66% of informants stated that Muslims urgently needed to hold a national ceremony, and as many as 22% of informants stated that Muslims urgently needed to hold a national ceremony to commemorate a historic day. Meanwhile, the group of informants who did not agree to hold a national ceremony commemorating the historic day, no more than 14%. With details, 12% of informants stated that it was not necessary, and 2% of informants stated that it was very unnecessary to hold a national ceremony to commemorate the historic day.⁴²

The next issue that is often debated is the issue of respect and raising the Red and White flag. The respect and raising of the Red and White flag carried out by Muslims is sometimes still rejected by some Salafi groups. Respect for flags or other state symbols cannot be equated with idolatry or worship of creatures. Because, in essence, respect for the flag or symbols of the State is only a manifestation of love, gratitude, and the spirit of protecting the homeland. Muslims pay homage to the flag not because of the substance of the flag itself but rather to commemorate the fighters who have sacrificed their lives and property for the upholding of the sovereignty of the Indonesian State.⁴³

Then, the essence of respect for the flag completely differs from respect in the sense of worship. The honor of this flag has the same position as respect for the pious person, the pious person, or respect for other human beings. Data in the field also shows

⁴¹ Mariyam, Personal interview, 2024.

⁴² Survey on the Concept of Nationalism & Religious Nationality in 2024

⁴³ "Hormat Bendera Indonesia dalam Islam," NU Online, diakses 12 Juli 2024, <https://www.nu.or.id/bahtsul-masail/hormat-bendera-indonesia-dalam-islam-RCvbJ>.

the disrespect of the majority of Salafis towards the respect and raising of the Red and White flag. This is as per the interview data,

*"Respect for the flag is only a symbol of respect for the struggle of the martyrs in liberating the Indonesian nation from colonialism, just like when we pay respect to both parents or teachers, so it is not true if there are people who think that respect for the flag is categorized as idolatry."*⁴⁴

This interview data aligns with the survey results, which show that 90% of the informants agreed to respect the flag. With details, 70% of informants said yes, and 20% of informants said it was very good to pay respect to the red and white flag. Meanwhile, the informants who disapproved of the respect for the red and white flag only amounted to 10%. With details, 7% of informants stated that they could not, and 3% stated that they should not pay respect to the red and white flag.⁴⁵

In addition to the issue of nationalism, there is also the issue of nationality that is no less important to discuss, namely the issue of democratic values in the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila following Islamic law taught by the Prophet Muhammad. Indonesia, as a Pancasila country, also facilitates and accommodates the implementation of every citizen's religious activities. At the same time, it still guarantees the freedom of each citizen to practice their own beliefs without being determined by the State. So, Pancasila does not contradict the values of any religion at all.⁴⁶

The concept of Pancasila democracy is based on the five values of Pancasila. Pancasila democracy is a religious and non-secular democracy. It is different from the secular and liberal individualist democracy of the West, and it is also different from the socialist democracy of China. By emphasizing the spirit of collectivity and providing responsible freedom to everyone, Pancasila democracy is a *tawasuth*/middle democracy that mediates between Western Liberalism and Eastern Socialism.

In Islam, democracy differs from the concept of deliberation; However, both oppose authoritarian governments. Substantially, the basic principles of democracy do

⁴⁴ Alimudin, Personal interview, 2024.

⁴⁵ Survey on the Concept of Nationalism & Religious Nationality in 2024

⁴⁶ C. Hildamona Permatasari, "Menteri Agama RI: Nilai dalam Sila-Sila Pancasila Sejalan dengan Ajaran Semua Agama," 18 Mei 2020, <https://www.lemhannas.go.id/index.php/berita/berita-utama/835-menteri-agama-ri-nilai-dalam-sila-sila-pancasila-sejalan-dengan-ajaran-semua-agama>.

not contradict or contradict the principles of the Qur'an. However, it should be remembered that the democracy that is implemented is not a secular democracy that separates religion from public life.⁴⁷ Even though many Islamic countries adopt democracy as a system of statehood, democracy is often considered a polemical and antagonistic system to Islam because it originated in the West.⁴⁸ These pros and cons the author also found when collecting data in the field, as the results of the interview below,

*"Pancasila democracy is very well applied in Indonesia; The values contained in it are in line with Islamic principles; for example, the fifth precept of social justice for all Indonesian people is very much in line with the values of Islamic justice, which prioritizes equality of rights and does not differentiate between one and the other."*⁴⁹

*"Although all Islamic teachings cannot be covered in Pancasila, at least the values contained in Pancasila follow a small part of the Islamic teachings."*⁵⁰

The results of interviews that are not Pancasila democracy are as follows,

*"Democracy does not come from Islam; Islam teaches deliberation in overcoming all problems, while democracy prioritizes the most votes in overcoming existing problems. The majority of votes in democracy determine all policies that will be taken even though they are not the best policies; in contrast to Islam, which prioritizes deliberation in making all decisions, the most rational and good opinions will be chosen even though they only come from minority votes."*⁵¹

The data from this interview is also strengthened by the survey results, which show that most Salafi informants state the value of democracy in the 1945 Constitution, and Pancasila is in line with Islam's teachings and the Prophet's guidance. As many as 72% of informants stated that the values of democracy in the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila follow Islamic teachings. As many as 15% of informants stated that the value of democracy in the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila is very much following Islamic teachings. As many as 9% of informants stated that the value of democracy in the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila was not following Islamic teachings. As many as 4% of informants stated that the values of democracy in the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila are very inconsistent with Islamic teachings.⁵²

⁴⁷ Didik Darmadi, "Konsep Demokrasi Pancasila Dalam Perspektif Tafsir Al-Qur'an" (masters, Institut PTIQ Jakarta, 2022), <https://repository.ptiq.ac.id/id/eprint/637/>.

⁴⁸ Didik Darmadi, "Demokrasi Pancasila Dalam Pandangan Ulama Tafsir Demi Mewujudkan Negeri Yang Baldatun Thayyibatun Wa Rabbun Ghafur," *Al-Tadabbur: Jurnal Ilmu Al-Qur'an dan Tafsir* 7, no. 02 (20 Desember 2022): 153–72, <https://doi.org/10.30868/at.v7i02.2882>.

⁴⁹ Muammar Khadafi, Personal Interview, 2024.

⁵⁰ Arif Rahman Hakim, Personal interview, 2024.

⁵¹ Haidir Mas'ud, Personal interview, 2024.

⁵² Survey on the Concept of Nationalism & Religious Nationality in 2024

The problem of other nationalism is the problem of corruption that has taken root acutely in the Indonesian State. The cause of corruption is indeed the weak religious values that exist in the attitude of Indonesian nationalism. Facts on the ground show that most informants (89%) think the cause of corruption is the weak religious values in the attitude of Indonesian nationalism. As for the indication, 67% of Salafi informants agree that the cause of corruption is due to the weak religious values that exist in the attitude of Indonesian nationalism. As many as 22% of Salafi informants strongly agree that the cause of corruption is due to the weak religious values that exist in the attitude of Indonesian nationalism. As for the Salafi informants who argue that the cause of corruption is not due to the weak value of the value of eligibility, only the minority group is 11%, while 8% of Salafi informants do not agree if the cause of corruption is due to the weak religious values that exist in the attitude of Indonesian nationalism. As many as 3% of Salafi informants strongly disagree that the cause of corruption is due to the weak religious values that exist in the attitude of Indonesian nationalism.⁵³

Based on the results of the survey above, it is known that the majority of Salafi people think that the cause of corruption occurs because of the weak religious values that exist in the attitude of Indonesian nationalism. This is because religious values are only studied as a theory but not applied daily. Many national figures who advocate nationalism and nationalism are also entangled in corruption cases. Corruption is an act that does not reflect nationalism and is very detrimental to the Indonesian people. National nationalism is only a political commodity echoed during the campaign season. The values of nationalism are not combined with religious values. They apply a nationalist attitude only if someone is supervising; if they are not, then they dare to commit corruption. It is different if nationalism is combined with a religious nature; then, the attitude of nationalism will be applied in all conditions because it always feels supervised by the creator.

Implementation of Salafi Understanding of Nationality Hadith and Nationalism in the Perspective of Contemporary Islamic Law

⁵³ Survey on the Concept of Nationalism & Religious Nationality in 2024

Salaf's understanding of nationalism and nationalism tends to vary, depending on the group and their interpretation of the teachings of Islam. In the framework of contemporary Islamic law, the implementation of this understanding is related to two main aspects: the principle of *maslahah* and *maqasid al-shari'ah*. These two principles provide room for a more flexible interpretation of the concepts of nationality and nationalism so they can be accepted in modern contexts, especially in countries where most of the population is Muslim.⁵⁴

For most Salafi groups, nationalism is not considered contrary to Islam as long as it can be seen as part of an effort to protect the interests of the people and the State. In this context, nationalism can be understood as a form of *ukhuwwah wathaniyyah* (national brotherhood) that supports unity and harmony in society. For example, in a hadith that teaches the importance of maintaining the unity of the ummah and supporting the country in the good, Salafi followers can consider that nationalism is part of implementing these teachings, especially in creating social stability and the country's progress. However, this view is not universally accepted among Salafists. Some people who are more critical of nationalism argue that the concept of nationality and nationalism have no valid basis in Islamic teachings, so they are considered innovations (*bid'ah*) that should not be accepted.⁵⁵ They argued that the modern concept of the nation-state did not follow the Islamic model of government during the time of the Prophet Muhammad, which prioritized the concept of *umma* (community of people), which is universal without national restrictions. This group is often referred to as "Salafi *haraki*" or "Salafi *jihadi*," and they emphasize the importance of loyalty to an Islamic state based purely on Islamic law, not on national loyalty based on the ideology of the nation-state.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ H.L. Murphey, "Who defines moderation? Adapting Islamist and Salafi identities in Tunisia to a changing religio-political field," *Mediterranean Politics*, 2024, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2024.2361602>.

⁵⁵ Ahmad Badrut Tamam dan Siti Fatimah, "Pemikiran Dan Resistensi Kaum Salafi Terhadap Radikalisme : (Studi Kasus Di Kecamatan Solokuro Paciran Lamongan)," *Madinah: Jurnal Studi Islam* 8, no. 2 (1 Desember 2021): 154-74, <https://doi.org/10.58518/madinah.v8i2.1345>.

⁵⁶ Wahyu Setiawan dan Fredy Gandhi Midia, "Community Acceptability to the Salafi Movement," *Akademika : Jurnal Pemikiran Islam* 24, no. 2 (2019): 391-410.

In contemporary Islamic law, despite differences of view, the principle of *maqasid al-shari'ah* (sharia purpose) allows for adjustment to modern socio-political realities.⁵⁷ The *maslahah* aspect emphasizes the importance of the benefit of the people, which can be achieved by maintaining the stability and unity of the State. Therefore, although there is a debate about the legitimacy of the concept of nationalism, many Salafi believe that nationalism is acceptable if it is seen as an instrument to achieve Sharia goals, such as maintaining the unity of the ummah, caring for the progress of the country, and protecting the common welfare. Practically, Salafi followers who accept nationalism implement this teaching in various activities that support nationality, such as participating in national ceremonies, remembering the history of Indonesia's independence, and teaching the value of patriotism to the younger generation. In this case, they see the activity as part of an effort to realize the benefits of the people, which is in line with Islamic principles that emphasize the importance of social unity and stability.

In Islam, the principle of *maslahah* emphasizes the importance of the benefit of the ummah to create prosperity and stability. Nationalism can serve to achieve this goal, especially in maintaining political stability, security, and community unity. With nationalism, sectarian conflicts and divisions can be minimized, while national solidarity becomes the binder for effective resource management. This supports common welfare, such as poverty alleviation, improved education, and infrastructure development that benefits all levels of society. The main goal of sharia (*maqasid al-shariah*), which is to protect religion, soul, intellect, descendants, and property, can be realized through healthy nationalism. The country's stability helps protect religion from insults and supports freedom of worship. The security resulting from national unity also protects people's lives from conflicts or external threats. In addition, national education contributes to developing people's intellect and science. By protecting the family from moral and social threats and creating equitable economic policies, nationalism plays a role in safeguarding the well-being of individuals and society. In contemporary Islamic

⁵⁷ Supardi Mursalin dkk., "Fiqh Tolerance in a Contemporary Context: The Response of State Islamic Religious University Students to Religious Extremism," *MILRev: Metro Islamic Law Review* 3, no. 2 (30 Desember 2024): 287-319, <https://doi.org/10.32332/milrev.v3i2.9866>.

law, nationalism can be seen as a tool to achieve sharia goals following the modern socio-political context. The principle of *maqasid al-shariah* allows the reinterpretation of this concept to maintain the identity of Muslims in the era of globalization and confront the domination of foreign cultures. Some circles, including Salafis, recognize nationalism as a legitimate means of maintaining the unity of the ummah, the sovereignty of the State, and the progress of the nation, as long as it does not conflict with Islamic principles. Thus, nationalism is a modern concept and an instrument to fight for the people's benefit within the Sharia framework.

Overall, within the framework of contemporary Islamic law, the implementation of Salafi's understanding of national hadith and nationalism can be understood as an attempt to adapt the teachings of Islam to today's socio-political realities, where nationalism is seen as part of the sharia goal to achieve the common good and maintain the unity of the *ummah*.

CONCLUSION

This study reveals that Salafi groups hold diverse perspectives on nationhood and nationalism. A small minority of Salafis reject nationalism, arguing that it lacks valid scriptural evidence and may lead to innovation (*bid'ah*). In contrast, the majority, known as "purist Salafis," accept nationalism as part of public welfare (*maslahah*) and do not see it as conflicting with Islamic teachings. From the perspective of contemporary Islamic law, this understanding is rooted in the principles of *maslahah* and *maqasid al-shari'ah* (objectives of Islamic law), which allow for the acceptance of nationalism to maintain unity, social harmony, and the welfare of the State. The implementation of hadith teachings related to nationalism and nationhood by Salafi followers is evident in their social and religious activities. Most Salafis support national ceremonies to foster a sense of nationalism and patriotism, which they regard as consistent with shari'ah's objectives of preserving the state's well-being. Although a minority opposes such ceremonies due to the absence of explicit scriptural evidence, within the framework of contemporary Islamic law, these activities can be seen as efforts to uphold *maslahah* and *maqasid al-shari'ah* while strengthening national identity in a modern state. For future research, it is

recommended to expand the scope of study by comparing the views of Salafi groups in Indonesia with those in other countries to determine whether there are differences in interpretations of nationalism and contemporary Islamic law. Furthermore, an in-depth exploration of the acceptance or rejection of nationalism within a global context could provide further insights into how Islamic teachings adapt to modern social and political developments.

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AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS STATEMENT

The researchers played significant roles in this study. Suwarjin was responsible for conceptualization, developing the methodology, and overseeing the overall research. Iim Fahimah contributed to data collection, formal analysis, and conducting the investigation. M. Aziz Zakiruddin worked on drafting the initial manuscript, visualization, and developing the software used in the study. Bariah Safrut focused on reviewing and editing the manuscript, managing the project, and handling the required resources. The strong collaboration among the researchers ensured the quality and success of this study.

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